work on the volatility of short-term imiterest rates under LEA, which considered longer time periods or absolute measures of variability, may be misleading. This article presents a theoretical argument to further support this conclusion. It should be emphasized that only the case ofa move from CRA to LEA is considered, hut the premise applies equally well to the return to CRA.
The outlimie of the article is as follows: First, the rationale for claiming that the case against LEA is overstated is presented. This idea is then formalized in the context of a simple linear stochastic model of the money supply process. Finally, the variability of varions interest rates and money is examined and some concluding comments are made.
THE RATIONALE
The concern that the theoretical case against LEA is overstated is based on the application of a simple principle: additional constraints are bimiding only if mdi- viduals behave differently than they would in the absence of these constraints.
4 That is, if banks already were behaving in much the same way that LEA permitted them to, then the effect of its introduction on individual and aggregate behavior would be small.
In order to see why this is the case, consider how a depository institution might manage its reserve position under CRA. Such an institution would be required to keep a fraction of its current checkable amid time and savings deposit liabilities in the form of reserves (vault cash and deposits with the Federal Reserve).
5 When the institution makes loans and investments, it creates deposits. Thus, it is usually presumed that there is a direct link between the institution's current lending and investment activities and its current holdings of reserves. In a simplified and, perhaps, naive form, institutions lend only the amount of their excess reserves. 6 Some argue that LRA severs this link.
Under LEA, depository institutions' reserve requirements are based on deposit liabilities from a preceding period. Depository institutions are free to make all the loans and investments they desire in the current period without affecting their current reserve requirements. 7
A depository institution's decision to make additional loans and investments need not be closely related to its current holdings of reserves. In the short run it can obtain additional reserves by purchasing federal funds, borrowing from the Federal Reserve, selling Treasury securities, managing its liabilities -such as marketing certificates of deposits (CDs) more aggressively -or by temporarily holding fewer excess reserves than it 4 Nearly all ofthe theoretical work on this subject starts with a model that is completely static, LIlA is introduced, transforming the static model to a dynamic one, It is clear that the conclusions of these models are based, in part, on the fact that they introduce a dynamic strmmcture to an othenvise static model; he,mce, these models pre' elude the possibility that LRA introduces a dynamic structure that is, at least in part, redundant, This paper considers this possibility, 'Because of the Monetary Control Act of 1980, depository institmmtions need not hold reserves directly on deposit with the Federal Reserve. Instead, they may hold them with another depository institution on a pass-through basis. 6 Actualhy, each individual hank has its own short-run deposit mimltiphier, which enables it to lend more or less than its excess reserves in the short run. See Boris P. Pesek and Thomas R. Saving, The Foundations ofMoney and Banking (MacMillan 1968) , chapters 12 and 13, 7 For a discussion of this possibility, seeR. Alton Gilbert, "Lagged would otherwise like to hold. Thus, even under CEA, a depository institution's decision to make current loans and investments is not constrained by its current holdings of reserves. 8
Ofcourse, if there was a reserve deficiency and if it were to run for an extended period of time, the institution would have to adjust its lending and investment activities to bring deposits into line with its reserves. Furthermore, since only three ofthe above techniques of reserve adjustment relieve reserve pressure on the system as a whole, depository institutions eventually may find it necessary to adjust their lending and investment activities if rates on short-term reserve adjustment assets rise relative to the institutions' lending rates.°T hus, depository institutions must eventually adjust their reserve positions by adjusting their loan and investment portfolios. For short-run (week-to-week) changes, however, they can rely on either the money market, changes in their holdings of excess reserves or the discount window. The link between current lending and investment activities and current reserves need not be strong.
A SIMPLE STOCHASTIC MODEL
In this section, the conjecture of the previous section is formalized with a simple linear stochastic model of the money stock. The model is intended only to capture the essential features of money stock determination under CEA and LEA and to illustrate the basic restriction associated with moving from CRA to LEA.
10 Th this sense, the model is illustrative and is not "Both federal funds trading and reducingthe level ofexcess reserves tend to reduce the average level of excess reserves for the system as a whole. This allows a given reserve base to support a larger money stock, Discount window borrowing increases the total reserve base of the system.
0~T heessential features are: (1) a contemporaneous link between the reserve aggregate and the money stock, even under LRA, (2) aim explicit dynannic structure under both CRA and LRA, and (3) random disturbances on both the supply amid demand side, In this model, the contemporaneous link between the reserve aggregate and the money stock is established only through the excess reserve equation. This is done as a matter ofconvenience, The limik could be established through the currency equation .,See Thorntomn, "Simple Analytics of the Money Supply Process."
presumed to be a complete description of money stock determnination.
The model consists of the following four equations:
The random errors, net and umm, are assumed to have zero expected values and finite variances, tr~and o~,, respectively. Equations 1 through 3 represent the money supply process.
11 The first defines total reserves as required plus excess reserves. The second defines required reserves as some required reserve ratio, r, times the money stock; the parameter 0 allows for either CEA (0 = 1) or LEA (0 = 0). In the third equation, excess reserves are proportionally related to the current money stock and inversely related to the market interest rate, i~.The excess reserve equation differs from most in that depository institutions make some proportional adjustment, X, to changes in required reserves. If X = 1, depository institutions do not adjust their current deposits to changes in required reserves. Instead, they absorb such changes by altering their holdings of excess reserves. 12 Equation 4 is the standard short-run money demand specification, where the market equilibrium condition has been imposed.
Equation 3 is important because it allows the LEA model to be given as a special case of the CEA model (0 = 1). This can be seen by solving for the equilibrium money stock and interest rate. The reduced forms for the equilibrium money stock and interest rate are given by equations 5 and 6:
'mIt should he noted that this model containms only a one-period lag, whereas, as implennented, LRA has a two-period lag. The oneperiod lag was adopted for compnmtational convenience, "Excess reserves arc treated as a buffer-stock asset, Furthermore, they are assured to he strictly positive and sufficient to deal with any reqnured reserve surprises dine to randonm fluctuations in u,, or u,,,,. This model is kept simple by considering explicitly only resen'e adjustment through excess reserve holdings. It should he clear, however, that the other adjustment mnecbauisms could be modeled,
Note that equation 5 is the same if 0 = 0 or if X = 1; the same is true ofequation 6. That is, the equilibrium money stock and interest rate are the same in a model with CEA, where depository institutions do not initially alter their current lending and investment activities to adjust their reserve positions (A = 1) as in a model with LEA. Thus, imposing lagged reserve accounting on the above model by letting 0 = 0 when A = 1 has no effect on the money supply; depository institutions would not have altered their lending and investment activities immediately in response to changes in total reserves anyway. The imposition of LEA is redundant if X= i.' 3
Effects of ERA on the Money Supply
Solving the first three equations, the mnoney supply, M 5 , is given by
where A~= Or(1 -A) + b. A comparison of the money supply when 0 = 1 and when 0 = 0 reveals basic differences between LEA and CEA that should be noted. First, the money supply schedule is more interestsensitive under LEA, as figure 1 illustrates.
Second, the multiplier on the reserve aggregate is smaller for CEA than for LEA.~Thus, a given change in the reserve aggregate shifts the money supply schedule further under LRA, The shift is significantly further so that the initial change in the equilibrium money stock is greater tinder LEA (figure 1). Thus, a given change in the policy variable (or any exogenous shock on the supply side) produces a larger initial ' 3 There is an implicit assumption that banik reserve adjustment behavior is invariant to the reserve accounting system. Recently, Spindt and Tarhan have provided empirical evidence that this was the case after LRA was introduced in 1968. It is inmteresting to note, however, that their evidence indicates that hammks relied less on adjustinmg current loans amid investnnents and more on changes in excess reserves, federal funds, discount window borrowings and CDs after LIlA 'vas introduced. The diffi,rences, however, were nn>t statistically significant. See Spindt and Tarhan, "Bank Earning As-set Behavior and Causality Between Resen-es amid Money.' ' t rhe multipliers are 1/6 annl l/(r(l -A) + 6) for LilA and CRA, respectively. Finally, the money supply equation is dynamic under LEA, but not under CEA unless A >0. This is an important difference. If the money supply schedule is assumed to be static, as is common for CEA specifications, then the adjustment from initial to long-run equilibrium is determined solely by the dynamnic structure of the demand for money. IfR. the money demand coefficient on lagged money, is positive (as nearly all the empirical work on the money demand equation suggests), then the initial equilibrium under CEA will be below the long-run equilibrium)" If only a static model is considered (CEA with A =~i. = 0) then the imposition of LEA introduces a dynamic structure to the model. '°itshould lie noted that neither LEA nor an excess reserve equation like equation 3 is necessary to get a lagged effect on the money supply. All that is required is that theme be a lagged effect in the public's demand for a component of a particular usonetamy aggregate or reservahie asset, For examnple, a positive coefficient 0mm either lagged currency or the time deposits in a standard money stock model will he sufficient to cause an initial overshooting ofthe stock would be above its long-run equilibrium: depository institutions initially would overexpand the money stock and oscillate toward long-run equilibrium. Ii LEA allows the current money stock to affect the future money supply. In the complete model, with lagged money in the money demand function, the long-run equilibrium can be above or below the initial equilibrium. The particular outcome depends on the relative strength of the supply-side and demand-side effects.
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These results can be illustrated by noting that equation 5 can be lagged and substituted into equations 5 and 6 to obtain the dynamic equations for the equlibrium money stock and interest rate: Letting E(M~) and E(i,) denote the expected value of these variables, the long-run response of money and the interest rate to a change in the reserve aggregate is
OR, a(6+r)+(i-p.)p long-run equilibrium in these models if their effect is sufficiently large relative to p.. Note that the long-run effect of a given change in the reserve aggregate does not depend on 0: it is invariant to the reserve accounting system. H The reserve accounting system affects only the dynamic adjustment toward long-run equilibrium, and then only if depository institutions follow a path different from the one they otherwise would have followed. Furthermore, a comparison of the long-run money multiplier above with the instantaneous multiplier of equation 5 shows that, under CEA (0 = 1), the long-run multiplier is strictly smaller only if~.a = 0, but may be larger or smaller if j.a>'O, as discussed above.Ẽ
ffects on the Vari-ahility of Money and interest Rates
We turn now to the important question of the variability of money and interest rates tinder LEA and CEA. In order to simplifr the analysis, the following assumptions are made:
Given these assumptions, the variance ofmoney and the interest rate for a k-period time horizon can be expressed as 
These expressions are independent of0 if A = 1. That is, ifdepository institutions already behave under CEA as LEA would require them to behave, the introduction of LEA would have no effect on the variance of money or interest rates. IfA < 1, however, the move to LEA will increase the variance of money and may increase the variance of interest rates, depending (in part) on the relative magnitude of the variance of supply-side and demand-side shocks: the variance of interest rates is smaller under LEA the larger the variance of demand-side shocks. The essential conclusion, however, remains: the increase in the variance of money associated with a shift in the reserve accounting system from CEA to LEA is smaller the closer depository institutions conform to LEA behavior already -in this model, the closer A is to 1.
A Graphical Presentation of l'he Results
The results are summarized conveniently in figures 2 and 3. Note that the variances of equilibrium money stock and interest rates given in equations 10 and 11 have both demand-side and supply-side components. That is, they depend on both o~and o~.Thus, the variance of M* can be decomposed into 4~' + cr~y~, where cr~and a~denote the variance of M* due solely to demand-and supply-side shocks, respectively. The variance of P' can be decomposed likewise.
Given the probability density function of um and u~, it is conceptually possible to construct a probability region for ff~* and ff~* from the corresponding region for um. This cars be done for supply-side shocks as well.
It seems appropriate to consider the variance around the long-run equilibrium. If the variance of money amid the interest rate around their long-run equilibria are denoted by Var (Mr) and Var (i'), respectively, then ' 8 it may seem odd that the long-run equilibrium is independent of 0 and A but not of p.. To see why this is the case, note that in long-run equilibrium, where M, = M~~= . --and BR, = BR, -m = -., the parameters 0 and A drop omit of equations 2 and 3, respectively. This is not true ofp. in equation 4. This would he the case even ifa growth mate model had been specified. Figure 2 shows a hypothetical 95 percent region for both M* and i~associated with a corresponding 95 percent region of demand-side shocks. The region for M* is larger under LEA than under CEA because the slope of the money supply schedule is flatter under LEA. By the same token, however, the region is smaller for i t under LEA. The slope of the LEA curve approaches that of the CEA curve as A approaches 1. If A = 1, the curves coincide and the variability of M* and i~associated with demand-side shocks is independent of the reserve accounting system. Figure 3 shows the 95 percent region for i~' and M* associated with the corresponding 95 percent region for supply-side shocks. Both regions are larger under LEA because the corresponding supply-side component multipliers (equations 10 and 11) are larger. These multipliers for LEA approach those for CRA as A approaches 1. If K = 1, these multipliers are identical and the variability of i~and M* associated with supply-side shocks is independent of the reserve accounting system. Thus, if banks initially relied on changes in excess reserves (or the discount window or the money market) to adjust to short-run changes in required reserves before the introduction of LEA in September 1968, the effect of its introduction on the variability of money and interest rates would have been considerably less than previous theoretical work would indicate. Moreover, the return to CEA may not reduce the variability of money and interest rates as much as many analysts anticipate, ifdepository institutions do not change the manner in which they make short-run adjustments in their reserve positions.
I I It
Furthermore, it could be argued that the new procedure for CEA may have a minimal effect because it lengthens the reserve accounting period from one to two weeks. Thus, even if depository institutions make loans in the current period regardless of the consequences of these activities on required reserves under LEA, this practice may not be reduced markedly because of the lengthernng of the reserve accounting period. Depository institutions may continue to make loans early in the period, waiting to settle (perhaps at the discount window, the money market or through changes fis excess reserves) toward the end of the period. Of course, curtailment of lending activities will affect their current-period reserve requirements under CRA, but not under LEA. 
I EMPIRICAL EVIDE-NCE ON THE VARIANCE OF MONEY A~D INTEREST RATES
Given that the effect of the reserve accounting system on the variability of money and interest rates appears to be in doubt, it would be desirable to estimate this effect. Unfortunately, empirical estimates from historical data may be of limited value. The observed variability of money and interest rates is a function of both the random components of the model and of movements associated with changes in the policy variable through time, as well as of changes in the structure of the system due to other changes, such as the introduction of LEA. This fact, coupled with documented and undocumented changes in the objectives of monetary policy, makes it difficult to separate the effect of the reserve accounting structure alone on the variability of money and interest rates. Nevertheless, it maybe interesting to examine the data to see if a picture consistent with increased variability under LEA emerges.
Three measures of variability are used: two relative measures, the coefficient of variation (CV) and the average absolute percentage change (AAPC), and one absolute measure, the standard deviation (SD).'°W eekly data are used for various snmbperiods from January 1966 to November 1982. The suhperiods were chosen on the basis of the introduction of LEA on September 12, 1968, and on the basis of announced changes in Federal Reserve procedures.
21 The three measures of variability, and the mean (X) ofMl appear in table 1. The same statistics appear in table 2 for the federal funds rate, the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the 4-6 month commercial paper rate.
'°Thestandard deviation is not independent of the imnit ofmeasure: 
Dat~iMr weetSkmgdats sh*wtr do~S
These data show that there was no incrcase in the week to-week absolute or relative variability of Ml immediately after the introduction of LEA in September 1968. If anything, there was a reduction in variability.
22 Furthermore, though there was an increase in the absolute variability of the federal funds and the Treasury bill rates, there was essentially no change in the relative variability. The exception was the commercial paper rate. It became more variable in both absolute and relative terms) 3 These data are broadly at odds with the general conclusion that the move to LEA increased the variability of money and interest rates.
Of course, one could argue that the theoretical results of the previous section are based on a model in which money is controlled through reserve aggregate targeting, and that the Federal Reserve was operating on an interest rate target during this period. Thus, the results of the theoretical model may riot be forthcoming over this period. Even an interest rate targeting "If one assumes that the absolute percentage chamige has a positive and finite variance, then one can rely on the Central Limnit Theorem to construct an asymptotic "t-test of the difièrences in the AAPC for two subperiods. The t-ratio for the test of the first against the second smibperiod was -2. 75 ftr Mi, indicating a significant reduction (at the 5 percent level) in the AAPC for NI I after the introduction of LRA. See Robert V. Hogg and Allen T. 
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented in this article indicates that the type of reserve accounting structure has no effect on the long-run equilibrium money stock; it can, however, influence the dynamic path to equilibrium if it forces depository institutions to adjust their reserve positions differently than they would have done otherwise. In this instance, the variance of money would increase with the shift from CEA to LEA and the variance of the interest rate might increase as well, depending on relative variability of demand-and supply-side shocks. In the absence of more detailed information about the exact nature of the dynamic adjustment process, the question of whether money or interest rates are more variable under CEA or LEA is empirical.
Unfortunately, the observed variability of money and interest rates is not simply a function of the reserve accounting system; it depends also on the random components of the model and movements associated with changes in the policy variable through time. Thus, it is difficult to assess the effect ofchanges in the reserve accounting structure alone on the observed variability of money and interest rates. The simple evidence from weekly data does not give a clear picture of whether the movement to LEA in September 1968 increased the variability of money and interest rates. The results differ depending on the measure of variability one uses. Nevertheless, if the average absolute percentage change is used as the measure of variability, there was no significant change in the week-to-week variability of Nil from January 5, 1966, to November 3, 1979. 
